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ABSTRACT ■ This article explores the origins and development of the
European Company Statute, with particular reference to its provisions for
employee involvement, both through a ‘representative body’ and through
board-level participation. European companies can be seen as ‘hybrid’
organizations in which common European-level elements are combined with
supplementary features deriving from the legislation of the country in which
they are registered. The article outlines the types of company that have
opted so far to become European companies and analyses a variety of the
issues raised, including the range of options that now confront management
in setting up such a company, the position of the unions and the
‘Europeanization’ of company boards. The principal conclusions are that
the Statute represents a further step in the development of ‘multi-level
governance’ of the EU, and that it will increase regulatory competition among
the member states.
KEYWORDS: company law harmonization ■ corporate governance 
■ employee board-level participation ■ European Company Statute 
■ multi-level governance
Introduction
In October 2001, the Employment and Social Policy Council of the
European Union adopted the European Company Statute (ECS) after
31 years in the making, ‘probably the longest legislative process ever
experienced in this field’ (EWCB, 2002a: 7). The Regulation and
Directive giving effect to the ECS came into force three years later in
October 2004, and took effect across the European Economic Area
(EEA), the (then) 25 member states of the EU along with Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway. The Regulation, which is directly applicable,
came into force on 8 October 2004, though transposition of the Directive
into national legislation was patchy: only nine countries, including the
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UK, met this deadline, though the others have subsequently transposed
the ECS.1
These two new legal instruments are designed to encourage the
creation of ‘European companies’, that is, companies that operate
across the EEA governed by a single set of management and reporting
systems. The Regulation covers the legal structure of the European
company (Societas europaea, SE), while the Directive covers employee
representation, a highly controversial feature of the ECS and the
principal focus of this article. This unified framework of legislation is
intended to simplify the range of regulations otherwise applicable to
companies in each member state, reduce administrative and legal
costs, and promote economies of scale. Furthermore, SEs should be
able to restructure themselves more easily across borders as they can
relocate their registered offices without being restricted by national
bureaucracies.
Between 8 October 2004 and 8 September 2007, 96 SEs had been
established in 17 EEA countries (SEEUROPE network, 2007). The
SEEUROPE network identifies four categories of SE: ‘normal’ SEs,
‘empty’ SEs, ‘shelf’ SEs and unidentifiable or ‘UFO’ SEs. ‘Normal’ SEs,
of which there were 33, have both operations and employees. There were
also 14 ‘empty’ SEs, with operations but no employees, including
companies that subcontract services, and 17 ‘shelf’ SEs, with neither
operations nor employees, intended solely to be sold on to interested
parties to reduce set-up costs and delays. There were 32 ‘UFO’ SEs,
about which there is insufficient information for allocation to any of the
other categories. A further two SEs had been transformed back into
public limited companies and one had been liquidated, while seven more
were in the pipeline (making 106 in total).
Only the ‘normal’ SEs provide for an agreement on employee involve-
ment. Nineteen had established procedures for transnational information
and consultation and ten, not necessarily the same as these, had established
transnational board-level representation. The largest and best known
European company so far is Allianz SE, with some 160,000 employees
worldwide, which was registered in Munich in October 2006. An SE
works council has been established, and employee representatives fill half
of the 12 seats on the supervisory board.
The principal motives for the foundation of an SE have included: the
creation of a European identity; the simplification of corporate legal
structures and hence cross-border restructuring; the attraction of capital,
especially for cross-border projects; the reduction of operational risk; the
enhancement of capital efficiency; the simplification of the procedures
for relocating headquarters; cost reductions with an aim of improving
efficiency; using the SE as a vehicle for entering the European market;
and the desire for an improved competitive position.
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The European company can be seen as integral to the continuing
economic integration of the EU. Against the background of the Single
European Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it takes
its place as one of the most tenacious instruments designed to improve
the efficiency and flexibility of European corporate activity, in a line of
company law harmonization directives. This article examines the lengthy
development of the ECS, which it divides into five stages:
● genesis, 1959–70;
● attempted harmonization, 1970–82;
● flexibility, but failure, 1985–93;
● flexibility, and success, 1995–2001;
● main provisions and implementation, 2001 to date.
The article focuses in particular on the requirements placed in the ECS
for European companies to introduce employee board-level representa-
tion, and how these have affected its evolution and eventual content. It
also analyses the prospects for the future – the number and type of
European companies coming forward for registration, their motivation
and their significance for further economic integration.
Origins and Evolution
Genesis (1959–70)
The creation of a uniform structure for public limited companies across
the European Economic Community (EEC) was first proposed shortly
after the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The idea was mooted at two con-
ferences in 1959 and 1960 (Bärmann, 1970; Skaupy, 1966) and by Pieter
Sanders in his inaugural lecture as professor of comparative law at
Rotterdam University in 1959 (Sanders, 1973; Thompson, 1969).
Sanders argued that an ECS, with uniform legal status across all member
states, should supplement existing national company law systems, rather
than replace them. Furthermore, the European company should be
entirely voluntary: ‘those interested can take it or leave it’ (Sanders,
1973: 88). These principles underlying the SE – its supplementary and
voluntary status – have remained constant throughout. In 1962, the
French industries’ association adopted the idea, which the French
government subsequently proposed to the Council of Ministers in 1965
(Skaupy, 1966). The Commission asked Sanders to elaborate his
proposal, which it published in draft form in 1967. It was later revised,
and – as a ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation embodying a Statute for
European Companies’ – was submitted to the Council in June 1970
(Bulletin, 1970).
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Attempted Harmonization (1970–82)
The basic rationale for the ECS was that undertakings ‘should be able to
plan and carry out the reorganization of their activities at Community
level’ in order to improve their competitiveness (Bulletin, 1970: 5). The
principal difficulty was that the legal framework of European undertakings
remained national but that it ‘no longer corresponds to the economic
framework within which they are to develop if the Community is to
achieve its purpose’ (Bulletin, 1970: 5). The only solution, therefore, was
to allow the establishment, alongside national companies, of others that
were ‘wholly subject only to a specific legal system that is directly
applicable in all the member states, thereby freeing this form of company
from any legal tie to this or that particular country’ (Bulletin, 1970: 6). The
draft ECS therefore allowed for the formation, structure, operation and
liquidation of a European company, and included the highly controversial
issue of employee participation.
The draft ECS noted the wide variation in legal provision affecting
employee participation across the EEC, which in 1970 consisted of only
the six original member states (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). However, their laws
all reflected the common principle that employees must be ‘enabled to
unite in defence of their interests within the undertaking and to share in
the making of certain decisions’ (Bulletin, 1970: 87). The European
company should not only take this principle into account but ‘encourage’
it, as cooperation between employees and management, and between
employees in different countries, would contribute ‘to the solution of
particular problems which may arise when a company’s personnel is
recruited from more than one member state’ (Bulletin, 1970: 87).
The draft ECS envisaged three types of machinery for regulating
employee representation in the European company: the formation of
European works councils (EWCs); employee representation on its super-
visory board; and the conclusion of collective agreements. EWCs were
based on an extension of existing national legislation governing domestic
works councils, familiar across the Six, while collective agreements were
also a long-standing fixture of all European industrial relations systems.
The innovation – or potential innovation – was the reference to employee
representation on supervisory boards.
German legislation provided the model, because – at that time –
Germany was the only member state that required such representation
(Keller, 2005).2 Fearing dilution of its own legislation, Germany
convinced the Commission that ‘such representation is necessary in the
case of the European company’ (Bulletin, 1970: 88). Title V of the ECS
laid down the requirements; Article 137, for example, stipulated that at
least one third of the members of the supervisory board should be
employee representatives elected through the national institutions of
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employee representation acting as an electoral college. In due course,
both the Economic and Social Committee and the EP commented
on the text and proposed a number of amendments. The Commission
accordingly submitted its ‘Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation
on the Statute for European Companies’ to the Council in May 1975
(Bulletin, 1975).3
The main alteration was in the inclusion of co-opted members on the
supervisory board. However, there was still only one model envisaged:
one-third representation for shareholders, employees and members co-
opted by shareholders and employees respectively. Lack of flexibility
persisted despite the accession in 1973 of three new member states:
Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Denmark was later to introduce a system
of employee board-level representation in 1973, and Ireland in the public
sector. There were attempts to introduce a UK system in the 1970s, but
the Conservative government elected in 1979 resolutely opposed
employee board-level representation (Gold, 2005). The legal basis of the
ECS proposal remained Article 235 (now Article 308) of the EEC Treaty,
requiring unanimity in the Council of Ministers. By 1982, discussion in
the Council was deadlocked, and progress on the ECS was suspended.
Flexibility, but Failure (1985–93)
The prospects for adoption seemed better in 1985 with the publication of
the Commission’s White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market’. It
contained around 300 measures – focusing particularly on the elimination
of non-tariff barriers to trade among the member states by the end of
1992 – and was followed by the Single European Act, which took effect
in 1987, and applied qualified majority voting in the Council to promote
their introduction. These measures included the ECS, and in June 1987
the Council requested the institutions involved to make ‘swift progress’
on the measure (Bulletin, 1989: 7). The Commission soon published a
Memorandum designed to overcome the negotiating deadlock in the ECS
by offering all parties the chance to comment on various aspects, includ-
ing its voluntary status, the independence of national legislation and
three models of employee representation (EC, 1988).
These three models were subsequently slightly amended and incorp-
orated into the Commission’s new draft ECS (Bulletin, 1989). A member
state would be allowed to limit the choice of models for European com-
panies having their registered office on its territory, as their equivalence
was ‘ensured by the Statute’ (Bulletin, 1989: 9). Either between one-third
and one-half of representatives on the supervisory or the administrative
board were to be appointed by the employees or co-opted by the board;
or a ‘separate body’ was to represent employees in line with statutes laid
down in consultation with the representatives of the founding companies; or
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‘other models’ could be set up following agreement between manage-
ment and employee representatives. The new draft also allowed for the
introduction of a ‘standard model’ either by agreement or in case of failure
to agree, which was to conform to ‘the most advanced national practices’
with respect to information and consultation. The ECS thereby became a
‘hybrid’, subject to Community legislation on the one hand, but supple-
mented by national legislation, for example relating to taxation or specific
forms of employee participation on the other (Blanquet, 2002).
Furthermore, the Commission now split the ECS into a Regulation,
covering company law aspects based on Article 100a (now Art. 95) of the
EEC Treaty, and a Directive, covering the employee representation
aspects based on Article 54 (3) (now Art. 44 (2g)). Both Articles allowed
for qualified majority voting rather than unanimity on the Council. These
new texts were subsequently amended in 1991. The Directive, for ex-
ample, was amended with respect to the procedures for adopting the model
of participation, appointing members of the supervisory board and elect-
ing the representatives of the employees within the European company
(Bulletin, 1991, para. 1.2.47). Largely because of the disagreement of
Germany, Ireland and the UK regarding the equivalence of the three models
proposed, Council subsequently suspended discussions again in 1993.
Germany feared that the 1989 version of the ECS contained weaker pro-
visions on employee representation at board level, which might allow
companies based in, or operating in, Germany to avoid stronger national
provisions. Ireland and the UK, by contrast, opposed the introduction of
such representation through EU legislation on the grounds that the model
was inappropriate to their own domestic conditions (Goulding, 2004).
Thus the Single European Market came into effect without the ECS.
Flexibility, and Success (1995–2001)
EMU, culminating in the introduction of the euro in 1999, led to further
pressure to adopt the ECS, in addition to which the successful adoption
of the EWC Directive in 1994 demonstrated that progress on EU-level
employee participation was still possible. Business too continued to
lobby for the ECS (Blanquet, 2002). In 1995, the Commission published
a Communication on worker information and consultation (Gould-
ing, 2004), which recommended establishing a ‘general framework’ for
national-level information and consultation (later to become the Directive
adopted in 2002). The Commission suggested that the provisions on
employee participation in the ECS could possibly be dropped, as the
companies affected would be governed by the EWC Directive and the
new ‘general framework’ Directive (Goulding, 2004: paras 8–89).
Against this background, the Commission convened a ‘high-level
expert group’, chaired by Etienne Davignon, a former Vice-President of
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the Commission; its results were published in 1997. Noting the diffi-
culties in harmonizing the diversity of institutional and legal frameworks
for employee participation across the member states, the report ‘opted
for a different approach’, giving priority to ‘a negotiated solution tailored
to cultural differences and taking account of the diversity of situations’
(Group of Experts, 1997: para. 94c). The report therefore proposed that
negotiations between management and employee representatives should
determine the system of participation within each European company,
but that a set of fallback provisions should apply, particularly in case of
failure to agree. This approach – negotiations backed by statutory arrange-
ments – reflects that enshrined in the EWC directive in 1994.
The Presidency of the Luxembourg Council produced a revised draft
Directive in 1997, incorporating the Davignon report’s recommendations
on employee participation. One key area awaited resolution before the
Directive could be adopted unanimously by the Council, as required by
its revised Treaty base, Article 308. This was the ‘before and after’
principle, which guarantees the acquired rights of workers to participa-
tion in the European company to ensure that they are never eroded or
eliminated as a result of its creation (Blanquet, 2002). Following
protracted negotiations, the Nice Council in December 2000 eventually
agreed an opt-out clause to meet Spain’s reservations over this principle.
This allowed member states like Spain and the UK to exempt companies
from employee board-level representation when forming a European
company by merger and when none of them had such provision before-
hand. The Employment and Social Policy Council subsequently
concluded a political agreement on the Regulation and Directive, which it
at last adopted on 8 October 2001 (OJ, 2001a, 2001b).
But even then the controversy was not over. The European Parliament
(EP) prepared to challenge the alteration in the legal base under which
the Regulation and Directive had been adopted. Article 308 is the general
Article that allows the Council – on a proposal from the Commission,
and following consultation with the EP – to take ‘appropriate measures’
by unanimity to achieve one of the objectives of the EU. The EP called
for a change in the legal base to Article 137 (3) which covers ‘representa-
tion and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers,
including co-determination’ and would have allowed it a greater influ-
ence through its co-decision procedure. However, following debate, the
EP resolved to abstain from a legal challenge in February 2002, allowing
the ECS finally to come into force on 8 October 2004.
Main Provisions and Implementation, 2001 to Date
The formation of a European Company – or SE – remains purely volun-
tary and supplementary to national forms of company legislation. The
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Regulation allows four different methods of establishment, through:
● a merger;
● the creation of a holding SE;
● the creation of a subsidiary SE; or
● the transformation of a company already registered in a member state
and doing business in at least one other member state.
As we see below, the type of formation largely determines the model
of employee board-level representation. The formation itself is a complex
affair, which requires extensive consultation with the various stake-
holders (EWCB, 2002a; Goulding, 2004). The Regulation requires the SE
to have a general meeting of shareholders and either a single-tier admin-
istrative board or a two-tier management board plus a supervisory board.
Companies are free to choose between the two corporate governance
structures all over Europe. Additionally, the Regulation offers the SE the
chance to relocate its headquarters between member states without
hindrance.
The Directive governs provisions for two levels of transnational em-
ployee representation within the SE: employee information and con-
sultation through a ‘representative body’ (or equivalent procedures) and
arrangements for board-level representation, referred to as ‘participation’4
with safeguards to prevent the dilution or abolition of existing systems
(EWCB, 2002b). The Directive (Article 2 (h)) uses the term ‘involvement’
to refer to both these levels together. In this context the ‘before-and-after
principle’ (Article 18 of the preamble to the Directive) must be high-
lighted, as this ensures that the involvement rights within a company
existing beforehand remain in force after the establishment of the SE.
Because such a wide range of systems governing representation at work-
place and company-board levels currently exists across the member states
(EIRO, 1998; Group of Experts, 1997; LRD, 2004), securing agreement
on the provisions contained in the ECS proved exceedingly controversial,
which accounts for much of the delay in its adoption.
The Directive gives priority to negotiations between management and
employee representatives through a Special Negotiating Body (SNB)
in establishing involvement procedures throughout the SE. Broadly
speaking, the SNB and management can agree on any procedure of
employee involvement. But while in the case of ‘maintenance or improve-
ment’ of existing provisions a simple majority of the members of the SNB
representing a majority of the employees is required, in the case of a
‘reduction of participation rights’5 a two-thirds majority of the members
of the SNB representing two-thirds of the employees in at least two mem-
ber states is required. In addition, the number of employees covered by
board-level participation is crucial, and the critical threshold varies from
one form of foundation to another.
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However, the ‘standard rules’ outlined in the Annex apply in a number
of circumstances: if both sides agree; or if the SNB had not abandoned
negotiations; or if there is failure to agree after six months, or 12 by exten-
sion, and management still wants to establish an SE (Article 7). These rules
require information and consultation at sub-board level through a ‘repre-
sentative body’ in all cases, but their application to participation at board
level is more complex.
In the case of the transformation of an existing company into an SE,
a reduction of employee board-level participation rights is not possible by
law. The involvement rights granted in the member state where the
company was registered and continues to be located, following registra-
tion as an SE, continue to apply. In the case of mergers, or the formation
of holding companies or joint-subsidiaries, employee representation on
the administrative or supervisory board must match the highest propor-
tion of members of the competent board applicable in the companies
involved, prior to registration as an SE. If none of the companies involved
in the creation of an SE is subject to regulation requiring employee board-
level representation prior to registration, then the SE is not required to
introduce it.
However, companies have to meet a number of conditions (Article 7)
for the standard rules to apply. In addition to the conditions regarding
information and consultation rights, regulations governing employee
board-level representation must cover at least 25 percent of the workers
affected in the case of a merger, and at least 50 percent of the workers
affected in the case of a holding company or a joint-subsidiary in order
to be applied to the SE. The SNB may agree to reduce these representa-
tion thresholds, and it must decide on the model of board-level repre-
sentation to be introduced if more than one operates across the companies
involved.
By and large, the model of employee involvement in an SE is dominated
primarily by the form of foundation, which lays the cornerstone for the
scope of negotiations. As noted above, when a national joint-stock com-
pany is transformed into an SE, it is not possible to reduce employee
involvement, because procedures for employee involvement granted
beforehand must remain in force after the transformation. In conse-
quence, employee involvement becomes broadened out across the SE’s
European operations. However, in the case of an SE created by merger
or by a holding- or subsidiary SE, the scope of negotiations them-
selves turns out to be broader. In order to clarify this point, two hypo-
thetical cases are presented that are otherwise the same but where the
form of foundation differs. The countries were chosen because of the
extent of dissimilarity of the national models of corporate governance
(Vitols, 2001).
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Case 1. Company A, a UK public limited company (plc) with 4400
employees in the UK, Company B, a German Aktiengesellschaft (AG)
with 2500 employees, and Company C, a Spanish sociedad anónima
(SA) with 3100 employees, want to form a holding-SE with headquarters
in the Netherlands. The SNB consists of 12 members (five from the UK,
three from Germany and four from Spain) and can agree on any form of
employee involvement by a simple majority. This is because the number
of employees covered by any form of board-level participation before the
formation of an SE is still below the threshold of 50 percent applicable
in case of formation of a holding-SE, as until then only the German
employees had been covered. If management and the SNB agree, or if
negotiations fail but management still wants to establish a holding-SE,
and the SNB had not abandoned negotiations, then the standard rules
apply. This means that arrangements covering information and
consultation through the ‘representative body’ are applicable, though the
threshold – that 50 percent of existing employees must be covered by
board-level participation – is not met, and so the SE is exempt from
participation at that level. It can therefore be assumed that employees will
have information and consultation rights, but no participation rights at
board level. Nevertheless, board-level representation in the national
companies remains unaffected. The holding-SE can be registered in the
Netherlands.
Case 2. This time, the same companies – the UK plc, German AG
and Spanish SA – want to merge and register their headquarters in the
Netherlands. The SNB consists of the same 12 members. In the case of
a merger, all participating companies must be represented on the SNB,
and this condition is met. The SNB can agree by a simple majority on
the form of employee board-level participation, provided that this is a
system which covered at least 25 percent of the total employees
beforehand (the most advantageous being the German model).
It may even agree on a reduction in that form of participation,
provided that it votes by a two-thirds majority representing two-thirds
of the employees in at least two member states (in this case, by eight
votes out of 12). This means that the British and Spanish
representatives, who control nine votes, could together outvote the
German representatives and agree on information and consultation
rights only (without board-level representation). However, if manage-
ment and the SNB agree, or if negotiations fail but management still
want to establish an SE by merger and the SNB has not abandoned
negotiations, then the standard rules apply. In this case, not only are
information and consultation procedures applicable, but also the
standard rules regarding board-level representation apply as well,
because the threshold of 25 percent of employees covered by
participation beforehand was reached. The German model therefore
takes effect: half the members of the competent board will be employee
representatives. The merger-SE can again be registered in the
Netherlands.
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Issues Arising
Analysis of these hypothetical cases, and the actual SE foundations that
have taken place, indicate major issues arising regarding negotiations on
the involvement of employees, the operation of everyday business and
the implications for corporate governance. First of all, it should be
stressed that the SE has no influence on either national labour legislation
or employment contracts, which remain unchanged. In principle, this is
true also for the influence of the SE on employee involvement in works
councils or other forms of representation at plant level. That is, such
arrangements remain unaltered provided that the national legal require-
ments for application are still fulfilled. These might include, for instance,
the number of employees at a site required to trigger the threshold for a
works council, or – for a group works council – that the headquarters of
the SE is still in that country. However, in accordance with the autonomy
of the parties, other aspects of representation may be renegotiated.
Consequently, the SE agreement on the involvement of employees might
provide the opportunity to clarify participatory structures and hence
improve the situation for both sides by assigning different competences
to different levels of employee involvement both nationally and
transnationally. The opportunities created by the ECS might thereby con-
tribute to greater consistency of employee involvement at works council
and group levels.
A second issue is management’s scope for action, that is, the range of
alternatives open and the opportunities to define this range. This depends
on the legal basis in the country hosting foundation and consequently on
the nature of national transposition, the form of foundation and, last but
not least, the proportion of employees already granted participation
rights. Management’s scope for action therefore does not depend solely
on its intentions, but rather on the skill and expertise of its lawyers in
creating legal entities which offer the greatest scope for choice, without
actually constituting a misuse of the procedures. It can be assumed that
it is in the interests of management to have as many alternatives as
possible, and hence the greatest scope for action. However, avoidance or
circumvention of worker participation should not be seen as the
principal motive for the foundation of a European company. Various
commentators (Brück, 2004; Stegemann, 2005; TaylorWessing, 2004)
point out that the creation of European corporate identity, cross-border
mobility, the simplification of legal structures and cross-border restruc-
turing seem to be higher priority motives. Nevertheless, whether compa-
nies will seize the opportunity to achieve a reduction in worker partici-
pation at the same time as other benefits remains an open question.
As indicated in case 2 earlier, the ability to reach an agreement in the
course of negotiations might be identified as a third main issue. The great
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potential for conflict lies not only in the negotiations between the SNB
and management, but also in negotiations within the SNB between
members originating from different countries with different traditions,
experiences and preferences regarding employee involvement. Broadly,
there are three ways in which the membership of the SNB may be
determined: by works councils, or similar bodies; by unions; or directly
by employees (Fulton, 2006). Furthermore, there may be concerns over
the standard of training of SNB members and fears that, in some cases,
they may even be appointed by management.
The only matter that is clear for the moment is the position of the
European trade union industry federations. In their view, employee
representatives have a reactive role in the process of establishing a SE, in
contrast to the EWC where they have a more proactive role, because the
process is initiated by management. If management plans to establish an
SE, then the employee representatives will negotiate in good faith. Luc
Triangle of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) indicates that
the Federation and national affiliates involved in negotiations seek the
highest possible level of employee involvement (EMF, 2003). This is in
accordance with the resolution of the ETUC (2003) and the SE-checklist
drawn up by UNI-Europa (2004), which represents employees in private
sector service industries. Given the great variety of interests, preferences
and traditions of the national affiliates, this consensus within the repre-
sentative organizations at European level is remarkable. However, it is
not yet clear whether national employee representatives will abide by
these guidelines; the distribution of power among the actors involved
will be decisive. It is conceivable that managements might offer, for
example, investment or employment guarantees in exchange for a reduc-
tion in participation rights, in particular a reduction in the number of
employee representatives on the relevant board of the SE.6
The Europeanization of board-level employee representation can be seen
as a fourth issue affecting management and employees in the company, as
well as the trade unions and their European federations. Until now, only
national employee representatives have normally been present on the
competent board of national public limited companies,7 even though
some companies have a considerable number of employees outside their
country of origin. With the SE, it is possible that, for the first time,
employee representatives both in the representative body and on the board
will hail not only from the company’s country of origin but also from EEA
countries where the SE has subsidiaries or establishments affected.
Generally speaking, the origin and number of employee representatives
are fixed during the course of negotiations over a written agreement on
the involvement of employees in the SE. It is reasonable to assume that
employee representatives will represent the diversity of employees,
though some might argue that the SE falls short of the global reality of
046-064 EJD-086111.qxd  17/1/08  05:07 PM  Page 57
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(1)
58
many of these companies. While this may be true, a purely European
solution may seem preferable to no solution at all.
It remains to be seen how this European diversity with all its chal-
lenges, ranging from use of different languages to varying attitudes
towards cooperation with management, will be handled. The potential
for conflict, or indeed the ability to reach agreement at all, are issues
concerning not only negotiations on the involvement of employees but
also the everyday operations of the representative body and the company
board or boards. The lines of conflict may shift, not necessarily
between employee representatives from different countries, and new
coalitions may emerge, depending on the issue on the agenda, in ways
unfamiliar from past experience. By and large, employee representatives
and management will need to make great efforts to overcome these
conflicts, which will arise not only when the SE is formed but also later
when the parties are expected to work together in a constructive manner
on a daily basis. It is a moot point whether the decision-making process
and the decisions actually taken will differ in any significant way from
those before the launch of this new form of Europeanization.
Conclusions
Indeed, Europeanization affects not only the company and the actors
involved, but also the evolution of models of corporate governance. What
are the implications of the ECS for corporate governance in general, and
for industrial relations in particular, across the member states of the
European Union? The SE can be seen as a further example of the devel-
opment of ‘multi-level governance’ across the EU (Marginson and Sisson,
2006: 55). The Directive has now been transposed into national legislation
by the member states, and can itself be viewed as the outcome of various
accumulated compromises down the years. The Directive allows for
subsidiarity, in that it encourages negotiations to settle SE-specific
arrangements through the SNB, with the application of standard rules
only under specific circumstances, thus guaranteeing certain minimum
standards. And over time, informal processes – such as patterns of learning
and the diffusion of good practice – will undoubtedly influence outcomes
of employee representation in SEs, as they already have in the evolution of
EWCs (Gold, 2003). Furthermore, the formation of an SE remains purely
voluntary and its structure runs parallel to existing systems of company
law across the member states. For this reason, as noted above, it has been
described as a ‘hybrid’ organization, with a common EU structure supple-
mented by a battery of national elements (Blanquet, 2002).
In this context, controversy centres on whether the SE can be seen as
a means of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ integration. The former refers to the
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‘reconstruction of a system of economic regulation at the level of the larger
economic unit’, and hence implicitly to harmonization and convergence;
while the latter denotes, less ambitiously, the mere ‘removal of … barriers
to trade’ (Scharpf, 1999: 45), and hence implicitly mutual recognition of
continuing national differences – possibly enabling ‘regime competition’.
The ECS was originally intended to harmonize company law but,
as outlined earlier, the eventual Directive – with its emphasis on 
subsidiarity – reflects a process of ‘multi-level governance’ and frag-
mentation. The choice of structure of corporate governance and the
negotiations on the involvement of employees, for example, are noted by
commentators who deny that the SE can be seen as a means of harmon-
izing company law in the member states (Lutter, 2002; Schulz and
Geismar, 2001). But these conclusions can go further. The harmonization
of laws is regarded as a means to secure the Common Market (EEC
Treaty, Article 3.1h) by reducing transaction costs and sources of friction.
Complete harmonization would require a single European-wide legal
order that, from an economic point of view, would entirely eliminate
these barriers and so lead to gains in efficiency. However, this is essentially
a static perspective. The process of harmonization has itself on occasion
proved rigid and cumbersome, ending in deadlock, especially in the con-
text of enlargement. The fate of the draft Fifth Directive illustrates this
point: after years hopelessly waiting in the legislative pipeline, it was
eventually withdrawn in 2004.
However, the SE does not reflect the principle of reciprocal recogni-
tion either. Of course, an SE can conduct business all over Europe but, if
it moves its registered office from one member state to another, the
supplementary national legislation that applies changes too – including
its tax liabilities, the rights of stakeholders and the framework of labour
regulation – which is in clear opposition to this principle.
The key point is that the SE is considerably more highly mobile than
a national public limited company owing to the simplified procedures for
relocating headquarters that apply.8 For this reason, the SE constrains the
freedom of national legislators. The management of an SE is in the
position to make use not only of its ‘voice-power’ but also of its ‘exit-
power’, by ‘voting with its feet’ (Tiebout, 1956). In this way, it can exert
considerable pressure on those member states that do not satisfactorily
meet the demands and requirements of the private sector. For example,
when two companies merge and form an SE, the labour relations of
the countries involved must be a factor in determining where to locate
the headquarters. Since tax advantages accrue to the country where the
headquarters are located, this must act as an incentive to countries to cre-
ate a labour environment attractive to SEs. As a result, the ECS is likely
to promote regulatory competition between national legal frameworks.
Furthermore, it is also likely to promote such competition within such
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national legal frameworks. This is because if national legislators offer an
SE with, for example, a choice of board structures which is regarded as
advantageous by existing companies, then pressure will increase to
amend national legal structures to conform with this new standard. These
developments could prove detrimental to workers’ rights, though some
argue that such competition should not be rejected outright as it may
help to minimize state and market failure (Grundmann, 2001).
This article concludes that the main result of the ECS will be to increase
regulatory competition (Lutter, 2002). At the moment, it is still too early to
identify any trends either from the SEs that have already been formed or
from those planned in the near future, but a ‘race to the bottom’ should not
be regarded as inevitable. The evaluation of the outcome depends to a great
extent on subjective perspectives, and these might differ considerably
across Europe, since some countries require extensive mandatory employee
involvement while others require little or none. Trade unions and works
councillors in Austria or Germany, who are generally used to very high levels
of employee involvement, naturally fear loss of influence within the highest
organs of their companies. However, unions in certain other countries,
such as Spain or the UK, may gain access to board rooms and participation
in high-level decision-taking within the company. Some of the established
SEs have already demonstrated that employee representatives from different
European countries can sit on the same board (LRD, 2006). There is, for
example, now one UK employee representative on the supervisory board of
Allianz SE alongside one French and four German representatives.
The systems of corporate governance that survive may not be the least
restrictive but rather the ones that are best able to balance the interests of
all their stakeholders, including employees. These may yet prove to be
the systems that give companies the best chance of adapting to fast-
changing business environments in the long run. Current debates in the
field of corporate social responsibility tend to reflect these concerns about
the breadth of stakeholding that companies should embody (Williams
and Conley, 2005). However, whether the result is a ‘race to the bottom’ or
a ‘climb to the top’, the debates amongst academics and practitioners are
likely to continue for a long time yet (Charny, 1991). Either way, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that one model of corporate governance will eventually
triumph over another, given the enduring influence of institutional and
legal frameworks at national level.
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NOTES
1 By date order: Denmark (April 2004), Sweden, Hungary and Iceland
(May 2004), Austria (June 2004), Finland (August 2004), Slovak Republic
and United Kingdom (September 2004), Belgium and Malta (October 2004),
Czech Republic (November 2004), Germany and Cyprus (December 2004),
Estonia (January 2005), the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Latvia
(March 2005), Lithuania (May 2005), France (July 2005), Italy (August 
2005), Portugal (October 2005), Liechtenstein (November 2005), Slovenia
(March 2006), Greece (May 2006), Luxembourg (August 2006), Spain
(October 2006) and Ireland (January 2007). Romania and Bulgaria, which
joined the EU in January 2007, transposed the ECS in March and July 2007
respectively.
2 To this day, Belgium and Italy have no such provisions. French legislation
is merely enabling. Legislation in the Netherlands dates from 1971 and in
Luxembourg from 1974. German legislation dates from 1951 and 1952, and
was supplemented in 1976.
3 The ECS should not be confused with the draft Fifth Directive, first
proposed in 1972 and heavily amended in 1983. This Directive would have
required employee representation at board level in all large publicly limited
companies across the EEC. It remained deadlocked and was eventually
withdrawn in 2004.
4 ‘Information’ means that the competent organ of the SE informs the
representative body about any issues that concern the SE itself, its
subsidiaries or its establishments in another member state so that the
representative body is able to assess in depth the possible impacts.
‘Consultation’ means the establishment of dialogue and exchange of views
between the representative body and the competent organ of the SE. The
opinion expressed by the representative body may be taken into account
in the decision-making process within the SE. ‘Participation’ means the
influence of the representative body on the decision-making process within
the SE by means of the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the
company’s supervisory or administrative organ, or the right to recommend
and/or oppose the appointment of some or all of the members of the
company’s supervisory or administrative organ (Article 2 (i-k)).
5 This is defined (Article 3 (4)) as representation in the organs of the SE
‘lower than the highest proportion existing within the participating
companies’.
6 This paragraph draws on discussions at SEEUROPE meetings in
November 2004 and March 2006.
7 Exceptions can be found at DaimlerChrysler, where there are employee
representatives on the supervisory board from both Germany and the USA,
and at Aventis, where both German and French employee representatives
have seats.
8 This is so only for member states whose legislation requires that a company
is governed by the law of the country in which its headquarters are located:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain (Staudinger and Grossfeld, 1998).
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